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Initiating Coordination
Paul Weirich†‡
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common
knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player’s utility maximization among his
strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions
and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.
1. Introduction. Committee members meet to conduct business. Drivers
stay on the right side of the road. Workers divide the task of painting a
house. These are all examples of coordination. What principles of ratio-
nality lead individuals to do their parts in a method of coordinating?
Providing an answer presents a challenge for game theorists.
2. The Hi-Lo Paradox. This paper treats only coordination in single-stage
noncooperative games. In such games the players do not causally interact,
so coordination requires an epistemic foundation. Some theorists hold
that classical principles of rationality cannot provide that foundation.
Suppose that agents are hyperrational in Howard Sobel’s (1994) sense.
They are moved only by utility maximization. Habit, convention, pre-
cedence, salience, focal points, and so on have no effect unless they affect
the utilities of options. These common coordination devices are ineffective
among hyperrational agents. Such agents respond only to another’s par-
ticipation in an equilibrium. None moves toward an equilibrium unless
the others do. None gets the ball rolling, as Robert Sugden (2000) and
Margaret Gilbert (2001) observe.
Andrew Colman (2003) illustrates the problem using the two-person,
pure-strategy game Hi-Lo, which the following payoff matrix (Table 1)
depicts. There are two forms of coordination, one offering a high payoff
to each player, and another offering a low payoff to each player. A player
†To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of Missouri,
Columbia, MO 65211; e-mail: WeirichP@missouri.edu.
‡I thank the audience at my paper’s presentation at the 2006 PSA meeting for many
insightful points.
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TABLE 1. THE TWO-PERSON,
PURE-STRATEGY HI-LO GAME.
High Low
High 2, 2 0, 0
Low 0, 0 1, 1
has no grounds for assigning probabilities to his partner’s strategies. Clas-
sical decision principles give the players no reason to do their parts in
the superior equilibrium (High, High). Indeed, utility maximization
grounds neither coordination equilibrium. It fails even granting common
knowledge of the payoff matrix and of the players’ utility maximization.
Individual rationality appears to not generate coordination in Hi-Lo. That
is the Hi-Lo paradox.1
This paper resolves the Hi-Lo paradox. It shows that individual ratio-
nality generates coordination in the game Hi-Lo, at least if agents are
ideal and in ideal circumstances. Unlike the psychological game theory
Andrew Colman advances, it normatively supports coordination in ideal
cases. The idealizations reveal basic principles of strategic rationality
forming the structure of a general theory that eventually rescinds the
idealizations.
In contrast with some approaches to coordination, my approach does
not rely on repetition of games or the bounded rationality of agents. It
does not offer evolutionary explanations of coordination as, for example,
Brian Skyrms (2004) does. My objective is to explain the rationality of
realizing the superior equilibrium in coordination problems such as the
game Hi-Lo. This requires an account of the strategic reasoning of agents.
By way of analogy, consider equilibrium for a ball rolling in a basin with
several low spots. It is easy to show that the ball will settle in a low spot.
An explanation of its settling in a particular low spot is more complex,
however. It provides an account of the ball’s travels before coming to
rest. Similarly, an explanation of an equilibrium’s realization does not
show just that an equilibrium is realized but also provides an account of
deliberations leading to the equilibrium’s realization. An explanation ac-
counts for the agents’ strategic reasoning and does not just characterize
its outcome.
This paper explains how strategic reasoning in coordination problems
leads agents to a Nash equilibrium, in particular, a payoff-dominant Nash
equilibrium. Of course, explanation must start somewhere, and I make
some assumptions about the agents’ knowledge without explaining how
the agents acquire that knowledge. I show how strategic reasoning gen-
1. Donald Regan (1980, 18) presents a similar problem of coordination for two agents
committed to the utilitarian principle of morality.
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erates coordination given that agents have some initial knowledge about
themselves and their coordination problem.
3. Commitment. A common view suggests that coordination may arise
from commitment to coordination and to superior forms of coordination
when there are multiple forms of coordination. This section examines
commitment as a method of achieving coordination. Subsequent sections
evaluate specific applications of the method.
In noncooperative games commitment influences others only if they
discover the commitment despite the absence of communication. The dis-
covery may arise from the players’ initial knowledge of the game and of
the players. People readily commit to coordination in games such as Hi-
Lo and others know that they do. Knowledge of the payoff matrix of Hi-
Lo is often enough to lead each player to High. Does coordination arising
this way involve any irrationality?
Consider first, hyperrational agents. Unlike humans, hyperrational
agents do not perform an act unless it maximizes utility. In Hi-Lo the act
High does not maximize utility unless one’s counterpart performs it too.
Hyperrational agents are stuck. Neither player can use commitment to
initiate coordination. A hyperrational agent does not have recourse to a
pill that induces High, for instance. Although it may be rational to take
such a pill, it induces behavior not guided by utility maximization. Taking
such a pill is inconsistent with hyperrationality by definition. Any com-
mitment to perform High raises the probability of High. By definition, a
hyperrational agent increases the probability of High only if High max-
imizes utility. So he does not form the commitment. The commitment to
perform High has good consequences, but hyperrationality blocks the
commitment.
May rational agents, in contrast with hyperrational agents, use com-
mitment to initiate coordination? May any of the commitment devices
that humans use, for instance, be applied without irrationality at any
step? Commitments come in various types. Perhaps some type of com-
mitment resolves the Hi-Lo paradox without any irrationality.
Without communication, agents may know the agreement they would
reach if they were to communicate. That agreement is a focal point of
the sort used by Thomas Schelling (1960) to explain coordination. Each
may decide to do his part in the agreement. A disposition to decide this
way may be rational to form and to have. The act it issues is not irrational
even if performed in ignorance of its consequences. It is as good as al-
ternative acts, given ignorance of the acts of others. Moreover, agents
with common knowledge of the focal point may expect each other to do
their parts in that strategy profile, and then doing their parts maximizes
utility.
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The appeal to focal points just sketched suggests a general method of
using commitment to justify coordination. Suppose that agents begin the
game Hi-Lo already equipped with a disposition to participate in its pay-
off-dominant Nash equilibrium. Knowledge about agents may yield evi-
dence about the strategy profile they will realize. Each agent is committed
to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. The other agent knows this. The
commitment is rational to acquire because each agent knows that the
other responds to the commitment by doing her part in the payoff-dom-
inant equilibrium. So each agent knows that he will not act alone. Com-
mitment gets the ball rolling toward coordination.
Is an agent’s commitment to High rational to have? It is a commitment
to do his part in the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium without regard
for his partner’s act. The commitment yields an irrational act if the agent
knows his partner will perform Low. The agent may know that the adverse
circumstances do not obtain, however. The commitment’s disregard for
reasons may not lead to an act that flies in the face of reason. So perhaps
in favorable cases the commitment is rational to maintain as well as to
form.
Is it rational for an agent to perform the act the commitment issues?
The agent commits to his part in the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium
without independent knowledge of his partner’s part. Given his commit-
ment, he expects his partner to do her part. Doing his part in the payoff-
dominant equilibrium then maximizes utility because it arises from a dis-
position his partner knows he has, and knowing that she knows is evidence
that she will do her part in the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
This is the general method of coordination through commitment. It
alleges that pre-game commitment resolves the Hi-Lo paradox for com-
prehensively rational agents given that they are informed about each other
and their game. Making the method work requires specifying the type of
commitment and verifying that it leads to coordination without any
missteps.
To illustrate the benefit of commitments, consider contracts and prom-
ises. They may be utility maximizing even if they sometimes issue acts
that do not maximize utility. They may be rational gambles. Commitment
to perform an act without independent knowledge that the act is utility
maximizing need not result in a violation of the principle of utility max-
imization. The commitment may be a rational gamble, and the act itself
may maximize utility. In Hi-Lo, an agent’s commitment to High may not
result in a violation of the principle of utility maximization. Whether it
does, depends on his information about his partner’s response to his
commitment. Furthermore, whether his performing High is rational de-
pends on his information about his partner’s act. A rational act does not
require knowledge that it is utility maximizing. Given ignorance, ratio-
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nality requires only that it maximize utility under a quantization of beliefs
and desires. An agent does not know High’s utility ranking without know-
ing his partner’s act. His performing High may maximize utility under a
quantization of his beliefs and desires. Given ignorance of his partner’s
act, his performing High may be rational.
Although noncooperative games are causally static, they have an in-
ferential dynamics. A player may have a commitment to a payoff-dom-
inant Nash equilibrium. Knowledge of that commitment may trigger an-
other player’s participation. The players’ knowledge of their participation
may make it utility maximizing for each to participate. An agent’s com-
mitment may be self-enforcing in the sense that if others know about it
he has no reason not to honor it. If others know what he will do and
respond by following his lead, and he knows that they will, then he has
a reason to honor his commitment. Honoring it achieves coordination.
A commitment’s formation may be rational because of its good con-
sequences rather than because of the good consequences of the act it
issues. Consider a commitment to perform an act regardless of the act’s
consequences. The commitment may be rational because of its conse-
quences despite its being defectively motivated by the act’s consequences.
The commitment may be fully rational to have despite the defect in mo-
tivation because circumstances may make the defect acceptable. Whether
the commitment is fully rational depends on its specification and context.
In favorable circumstances it may be fully rational.
The foregoing appeal to commitment is an incomplete sketch. Com-
mitment is vague and metaphorical. A commitment is a disposition to
choose a certain strategy, but there are many mechanisms for commitment.
Whether a form of commitment is rationally grounded also depends on
the details of rationality’s principles. Section 4 considers whether team-
reasoning uses an acceptable form of commitment. Sections 5 and 6 con-
sider whether the commitment involved in an intention to perform an act
rationally yields coordination. For each type of commitment yielding
coordination, I investigate whether fully rational agents may form, main-
tain, and honor the commitment.
4. Team Reasoning. This section examines one way of fleshing out com-
mitment to coordination. It considers commitment to a team. This type
of commitment arises through identification with a group and involves a
type of reasoning called team-reasoning. After describing the way team-
reasoning grounds coordination, I ask whether each step of the process
is fully rational.
Michael Bacharach (2006) uses group identification and team-reasoning
to resolve the Hi-Lo paradox. He argues for realization of the payoff-
dominant Nash equilibrium. His approach, like mine, is classical and
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appeals to the players’ strategic reasoning. The classical approach, al-
though theoretically attractive, has seemed unworkable. Bacharach in-
geniously shows how to overcome obstacles to it. He revises principles of
reasoning so that group identification yields coordination without vio-
lating the principles. His appeal to group identification is carefully
grounded in social psychology. However, his principles of reasoning are
controversial because they reject individualism.
Bacharach begins by attending to the role of frames in decision-making.
Different agents see the same decision problem differently, and the dif-
ference in their perspectives explains differences in their decisions. Fram-
ing also explains focal points and so elaborates Thomas Schelling’s (1960)
suggestions concerning coordination.2 The way an agent frames a coor-
dination problem affects her behavior in the problem. An agent may see
herself as acting independently of others, or as acting as a member of a
team. The latter perspective resolves the Hi-Lo paradox. If an agent does
her part in the strategy profile that best advances team goals, she does
her part in the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Bacharach turns to social psychology for an account of the features of
social interaction that trigger group identification. He argues that the game
Hi-Lo has those features. Each player may be expected to identify with
the pair of players. Then team-reasoning leads each player to High. Group
identification may not resolve every coordination problem, but it yields
the superior form of coordination in Hi-Lo.
Bacharach introduces restricted and circumspect team-reasoning to take
account of an agent’s beliefs about the prospects of other agents’ adopting
team-reasoning. The hedged forms of team-reasoning respond sensibly to
the danger that others will exploit team-reasoners. They describe assur-
ances about others that sensible team-reasoning requires.
Bacharach holds that rationality permits, although it does not require,
team-reasoning. Is that reasoning fully rational? Team-reasoning permits
an agent to act contrary to her preferences when they are fully rational
and balance all considerations. Such acts violate a basic principle of ra-
tionality. Bacharach holds that an agent adopting a team perspective does
not see herself as acting against her preferences. She frames her decision
just one way, namely, as advancing the team’s goals. However an agent
may be simultaneously aware of both her own and collective preferences
and may see that advancing collective preferences conflicts with her own
preferences. In any case, even if an agent with a team perspective loses
sight of her own preferences, the rationality of acting contrary to her own
preferences is hard to defend.
2. Frederic Schick (2003) makes related points about framing.
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Bacharach appeals to evolution to explain the origin of team-reasoning.
He adopts Elliot Sober and David Wilson’s (1998) argument for group
selection and then claims that team-reasoning is evolution’s mechanism
for group selection among humans. Team-reasoning is the proximate cause
of coordination. Bacharach notes that evolution is likely to yield efficient
mechanisms of group selection and thinks that team-reasoning is efficient.
However, a single form of reasoning, such as utility maximization, that
relies on payoff transformations to achieve coordination is more efficient
than two independent forms of reasoning, such as individual- and team-
reasoning, together with a device for selecting a form of reasoning. Ef-
ficiency suggests that reasoning follows preferences, and that preference
revisions assist collective objectives.
Bacharach claims that payoff transformations do not resolve the Hi-
Lo paradox, but he has in mind restricted types of payoff transformation.3
Payoff transformations that make High a dominant strategy for each
player resolve the Hi-Lo paradox. Certain types of payoff transformation
reconcile team behavior with individual preferences. Commitment to a
team may generate conciliatory transformations, and through them co-
ordination, without abandoning individualistic standards of rationality.
When using payoff transformations and the commitments they generate
to justify coordination, the crucial step is establishing the transformations’
rationality. The classical tradition, which I am following, puts aside eval-
uation of basic preferences. Therefore, rather than launch an evaluation
of payoff transformations, I turn to another account of commitment and
coordination that is also individualistic but does not rely on substantive
principles of rational preference formation.
5. Intentions. An intention to act is a type of commitment. In the game
Hi-Lo, may an effective intention to do one’s part in the superior equi-
librium replace a noncognitively grounded disposition to do one’s part
in that equilibrium? An intention requires less preparation than other
dispositions. An agent directly controls his intentions, whereas he only
indirectly controls his other dispositions. This section and the next argue
that fully rational agents may use intentions to generate coordination.
To start, I examine intentions. An intention is a short plan. So to
elucidate intentions, I review some basic points about plans. Why does
an agent adopt a plan? To adopt a plan is to decide now about future
acts. Why not put off decisions about future acts until the times for them
arrive? May it maximize utility among possible decisions at a time to
adopt a plan rather than postpone decisions about future acts?
3. See Colman (2003) for a discussion of the types of payoff transformations Bacharach
considers. See especially his comments on the “bloated” Hi-Lo game.
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Cognitively limited agents have good reasons to adopt plans. Adopting
a plan is a way of achieving an act. This way of realizing an act may
reduce deliberation costs. Instead of deliberating at each moment, an agent
just executes her plan to perform the act. Earlier deliberations settle her
future act. Because of the costs of continuous deliberation, cognitively
limited agents profit from using plans to realize acts.4
Imperfect agents such as humans also use intentions to improve the
rationality of their acts. A person forms an intention to perform an act
to raise the probability of performing the act. Deliberating to identify a
rational act and then forming an intention to perform the act increases
the probability of performing a rational act.
An ideal agent has no cognitive limits but still may gain from forming
intentions. Forming an intention is a way of creating a reason to act, as
Bruno Verbeek (forthcoming) observes. Intention formation therefore has
at least two types of benefit. First, an intention may prevent vacillation,
which is costly. For example, in the case of Buridan’s ass, an intention
tips the scales toward a pile of hay. It ends vacillation. Second, as the
next section argues, forming an intention may initiate coordination. Even
a perfect agent, who may act in a utility maximizing way without delib-
eration or decision, may profit from forming an intention to act because
the intention facilitates coordination.
Forming an intention to perform an act is a type of commitment be-
cause knowingly failing to fulfill a current intention one can fulfill at will
is incoherent. Having an intention to perform an act increases the sub-
jective probability of the act. It gives oneself a reason to perform the act.
A rational agent may form an intention to act because of the consequences
of the intention rather than because of the consequences of the act. How-
ever, intentions require justification by their content. Whereas a dispo-
sition to act may be rational to have because of its effects alone, an
intention to act is rational to have only if it has both good effects and
cognitive support. That is why Greg Kavka’s (1983) toxin puzzle is hard
to solve. The intention to drink the toxin, despite its good consequences,
is irrational unless there are good reasons to drink the toxin.
To show that a fully rational agent may form an intention to act, with
the objective of giving himself a reason to act, consider an agent who is
indifferent between his options. He forms an intention to perform a certain
act. Forming the intention itself has good consequences. It ends the de-
cision problem. The intention also meets cognitive standards. There is no
reason to rescind it. Furthermore, there are reasons for the act intended.
Given the intention, the act has good consequences. It fulfills an intention.
4. Michael Bratman (1999, Chapter 2) makes similar points about the role of planning
for cognitively limited agents.
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The act does not promise better consequences than its rivals prior to the
intention, but after forming the intention the act promises better conse-
quences than its rivals because it alone fulfills an intention. That extra
reason tips the balance in favor of the act intended.
In a decision problem, options are possible decisions. A decision is the
formation of an intention to perform an act. The decision is certain to
be realized if adopted, but the act decided upon may not be realized despite
the intention to perform it. An intention to act may not be carried out.
Events may frustrate an intention, or an agent may abandon an intention.
According to a common view, which this section adopts, given full
information a plan’s execution is rational only if its execution is optimal.
Given uncertainty a plan’s execution is rational only if its execution max-
imizes utility. Similarly, given uncertainty a plan’s adoption is rational
only if its adoption maximizes utility. Its adoption’s outcome typically
but not necessarily includes the plan’s execution. Because plans adopted
may not be executed, the utility of a plan’s adoption is not necessarily
the same as the utility of its execution. A plan rational to adopt may be
irrational to execute. Someone who resolutely executes a plan to retaliate
if attacked acts irrationally, if he is attacked and retaliation brings no
benefits, even though the plan’s adoption was rational because of the
prospect of deterrence.
Suppose that an agent has irrationally adopted a plan. Its irrational
adoption is an unacceptable mistake. The execution of the plan is rational
only if it is rational given correction of that mistake and so, typically,
only if it is rational independently of the plan.
A plan rationally adopted is rationally retained if no new relevant
consideration arises, such as a change in the beliefs or desires supporting
the plan. It is irrationally retained if it is unresponsive to relevant changes
in circumstances. Irrationally retaining a plan is also an unacceptable
mistake.
Under what circumstances is a plan irrationally retained? Generally,
persevering with a plan is the best way to reach the long-term objective
that prompted the plan. Abandoning or changing a plan is usually inferior
to persevering. For example, if one wants to go to Chicago and plans to
take the train, then upon arrival at the train station it is generally better
to persevere than to adopt a new plan to drive to Chicago. Only salient
changes should trigger a review. The appropriate level and type of re-
sponsiveness is achieved, not by deliberation, but by habits governing
spontaneous review of plans. One should cultivate habits of spontaneously
reopening deliberations at appropriate moments. Reopening deliberations
too readily is the mistake of distraction, or irresoluteness. Excessive re-
sistance to reopening deliberations is the mistake of obstinacy, or inflex-
ibility. The optimal habit reopens deliberations when the benefits outweigh
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the costs. The benefits, like the benefits of gathering information, are
increases in the expected value of maximizing utility. Calculating costs
and benefits is costly. An optimal habit responds to them without cal-
culation. Nonoptimal habits, easier to inculcate, respond to them less
reliably. A rational agent develops the best habits his circumstances per-
mit. A decision about execution of an act planned may be rational despite
deliberation unjustified by benefits, or despite lack of deliberation justified
by benefits. It is rational if the agent’s habits of spontaneously reopening
deliberation are rationally aimed at reopening deliberation if and only if
justified by benefits. A fully rational agent makes no mistakes in retention
and execution of an intention.
6. Intentions Yielding Coordination. This section shows that rational
agents may solve coordination problems because they form intentions
that all foresee. Moreover, comprehensively rational agents may solve
coordination problems this way because the intentions yielding coordi-
nation are rational to form, maintain, and execute.
In a single-stage noncooperative game such as Hi-Lo, an intention
prompts coordination not by causally influencing other agents but rather
because other agents foresee it. Foreknowledge of the intention influences
other agents. Others may know the agent has or will form the intention.
He may announce his intention prior to the game, or others may know
his character and aptness to form the intention, perhaps, because of his
comprehensive rationality. This foreknowledge may causally influence the
players’ acts. In the game Hi-Lo all may know of at least one player that
he is an instigator of coordination. Moreover, this may be common knowl-
edge. The instigator then gives himself a reason to perform High by
forming the intention to perform High.
An intention to do one’s part in High may replace a noncognitively
grounded disposition to do one’s part in High. The intention requires less
preparation than the disposition. Its origin relies on decision preparation
less than the disposition does. Reliance on intention is an attractive al-
ternative to reliance on other forms of decision preparation. Intentions
furnish a type of commitment an agent easily controls.
Suppose that a player forms the intention to perform the strategy High.
Full rationality requires the rationality of forming, maintaining, and ex-
ecuting the intention. It requires more than utility maximization among
strategies in the game. It evaluates as well the player’s intention to perform
High. The intention requires grounding in reason and in that respect
differs from a disposition induced by a pill. Without such grounding, the
intention provides an insufficient bootstrapping reason for an act, as Mi-
chael Bratman (1987, 24–27) observes.
A player’s intention to perform High has both good consequences and
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cognitive support assuming that the other player foresees it. Given fore-
knowledge of the intention, the other player maximizes utility by per-
forming High herself. Forming the intention to perform High is rational
because it triggers coordination. The intention to perform High is cog-
nitively supported because performing High maximizes utility given that
one’s partner performs High. Having the intention is cognitively sup-
ported by the act’s benefits given the intention’s effects.
Compare forming that intention with forming a belief for pragmatic
reasons. Consider, say, acquiring the belief that one will win a contest.
One acquires the belief so that one will obtain the performance benefits
of confidence. To be rational, the belief must also be epistemically justified.
So suppose also that one knows confidence in victory makes one perform
well enough to win. Then although one forms the belief for pragmatic
reasons, one’s holding it is epistemically justified because having the belief
raises its prospects of being true. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
For another analogy, compare forming the intention to perform High
with a self-supporting belief. Suppose that I believe that I formed a belief
today. Perhaps before I formed the belief I had not formed a belief today.
After I form the belief, the belief supports itself. A rational person may
form the belief without reason but may then retain the belief for epistemic
reasons because the belief is self-supporting. The belief’s rationality does
not require supporting evidence prior to its formation because it provides
its own support.
Forming the intention to perform High is utility maximizing given its
consequences. Having the intention is also rational because of its con-
sequences. The reasons for having the intention do not arise from the
consequences of performing High but from the consequences of the in-
tention itself. Furthermore, performing High is utility maximizing given
the intention’s formation and the response it elicits. Fully rational agents
may form self-supporting beliefs and intentions because of their good
consequences.
A hyperrational agent cannot use an intention to initiate coordination.
Such an agent forms an intention to perform an act only if the act max-
imizes utility. An intention to perform High raises the probability of High.
By definition, a hyperrational agent increases the probability of High only
if the act maximizes utility. So he does not form the intention. The in-
tention to perform High has good consequences, but his character pre-
vents it. He does not form the intention to perform High because the act
does not maximize utility. It does not maximize utility unless he forms
the intention to perform High and thereby elicits High from his partner.
He has a chicken-and-egg problem.
Fully rational ideal agents, even perfect agents, can generate reasons
by forming intentions prior to games they enter. One creates a reason to
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perform an act by intending to perform the act. Fulfillment of an intention
is a reason to act. An agent’s intention to perform High by itself does
not yield a sufficient reason to perform High. However, if it gives his
partner a reason to perform High herself, then it gives him a sufficient
reason to perform High. For rational ideal agents informed about their
game and each other, reasons to perform High are mutually reinforcing.
Having the intention to perform High furnishes a new reason to perform
High. Knowledge of the intention gives one’s partner a reason to perform
High. Her performing High gives one a reason to perform Hi, and so on.
The intention increases the probability of Hi, and an increase is all it
takes to get the ball rolling toward coordination.
Fully rational agents may generate reasons by forming intentions. They
may form, have, and execute intentions to do their parts in optimal meth-
ods of coordination. The commitments their intentions constitute resolve
coordination problems.
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